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A View of the Rhode Island Pension
Landscape: The Potential Reform of
Local Pension Plans Under the
Preemption Doctrine
Andre S. Digou*
INTRODUCTION

On a national scale, public debate surrounding the
deteriorating status of pension systems and the inability of states,
cities and towns to meet funding obligations has likely reached its
peak. Despite being the smallest state in the United States
geographically, Rhode Island has been at the center of the debate
because of unprecedented pension reform legislation enacted in
2011. Rhode Island, with only thirty-nine cities and towns, has
four state-administered pension plans and thirty-six locallyadministered pension plans. As of June 2012, the four stateadministered plans were collectively unfunded by approximately
$4.8 billion. As of June 2009, the locally administered plans were
only 43% funded and had an unfunded liability of approximately
$1.9 billion. While the 2011 pension reform legislation was aimed
at rectifying the state administered plans, locally administered
plans remain largely unaltered and ripe for state intervention.
Section I of this article discusses the overall pension
landscape in Rhode Island, including the types of pension plans
* Andre S. Digou is an associate at Chace Ruttenberg & Freedman, LLP, in
Providence, Rhode Island, where he practices primarily in the areas of
corporate law, civil and commercial litigation, and insolvency law. The views
expressed herein are of the author only and not the views of Chace
Ruttenberg & Freedman, LLP or its clients.
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and plan participants. Section II of this article focuses on the
sweeping pension reform enacted by the Rhode Island legislature
in 2011. Section III analyzes Rhode Island’s approach to pension
modifications. Section IV discusses a unified approach to pensions
in Rhode Island and potential legislative remedies to the existing
local pension scheme. Finally, Section V concludes that, should
the Rhode Island legislature desire to reform local pension plans,
the legislature could do so by unifying the existing local pension
scheme under preemption doctrine principles and without
modifying existing participants’ benefits.
I.

THE RHODE ISLAND PENSION LANDSCAPE

A. State-Administered Plans
Rhode Island, comprised of just thirty-nine cities and towns,
has four distinct state-administered retirement plans, each of
which was created pursuant to statute.1 The four stateadministered retirement plans are: (1) the employee retirement
system of Rhode Island (“ERSRI”), which includes state employees
and teachers; (2) the municipal employee retirement system
(“MERS”), which includes locally funded plans which elect to
participate in MERS; (3) the Rhode Island State Police Retirement
Benefits Trust (“SPRBT”); and (4) the Rhode Island Judicial
Retirement Benefits Trust (“JRBT”) (collectively referred to as the
“State System”). 2 The State pools plan funds for investment
purposes, and the Rhode Island Retirement Board (“Retirement
Board”) administers the State System. 3 The Rhode Island General
Treasurer, who is responsible for the State System’s investment
1. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 36-8-1 to -10-40 (West 2006 & Supp.
2013) (ERSRI); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 45-21-1 to -66 (West 2006 & Supp.
2013) (MERS); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 42-28-22 to -22.3 (West 2006 & Supp.
2013) (SPRBT); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 8-3-8 to -8.2 (West 2006 & Supp.
2013) (JRBT).
2. To be precise, according to the General Treasurer’s Chief of Staff, in
2010 there were 113 named plans encompassed in the four stateadministered plans, and 36 locally administered pension plans. See C.
Eugene Emery Jr., King Says Rhode Island’s Public Employees Have 150
Different Pension Plans, POLITIFACT (Aug. 30, 2010, 12:01 a.m.), http://www.
politifact.com/rhode-island/statements/2010/aug/30/kernan-kerry-king/kingsays-rhode-islands-public-employees-have-150-/. So, there are actually 149
different named pension plans in Rhode Island. See id.
3. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 36-8-4(a).
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decisions and setting asset allocation strategies, chairs the
Retirement Board. 4
The majority of State System participants are covered by a
defined benefit plan (commonly referred to as a “DB Plan”), which
means that retirement allowances are calculated using a preset
formula. 5 DB Plans are funded by a combination of employee and
employer (i.e. the state, city, town or local entity) contributions
plus investment returns on the funds invested. Participants with
DB plans generally receive cost of living adjustment (“COLA”) 6
increases, and retirement eligibility is based on years of credited
service or satisfying certain age requirements set forth in the
statutes. 7 Retirement allowance is computed using an average of
the participant’s highest earned salary calculated over three years
(or five years, depending on the date of retirement eligibility),
multiplied by the number of credited years of service. 8
Participants receive their retirement allowance in fixed equal
monthly installments after retirement.9 DB plan contributions
are not correlated with the performance of plan investments, and
therefore the employer bears the risk of investment performance
and accuracy of the plan’s financial assumptions.10
Some participants, however, are covered by a defined
contribution plan (commonly referred to as a “DC Plan”) whereby
retirement allowances are calculated based on the employee’s
contributions, employer contributions, and investment returns.11
A DC Plan, unlike a DB Plan, offers the participant an
opportunity to select investments for their personal account and
4. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 36-8-4, -9.
5. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 36-10-9, -10.
6. COLAs are adjustments in contribution percentages that are
commonly used to combat erosion of pension funds by inflation. Once granted,
COLA adjustments compound and cause a sharp increase in the funding
obligation of the funding entity.
7. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 36-10-9 to -9.3 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-16-12 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).
8. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 36-8-1(5) (West 2006 & Supp. 2013); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 38-10-10 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013) (state employees); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 16-16-13 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013) (teachers).
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See Frequently Asked Questions – Hybrid Plans, STATE OF RHODE
ISLAND OFFICE OF THE GENERAL TREASURER, http://www.treasury.ri.gov/secure
-path-ri/rirsa/faq/hybrid-how.php (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
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supplement contributions made by employers up to certain IRS
monetary limits. Like an individual retirement account,
participants in a DC Plan receive a lump-sum payment upon
retirement (which can be converted into an annuity or drawn
down), and DC Plans are portable to subsequent employment.12
Under a DC Plan, the employee bears the risk of investment
performance. 13
Generally, any employee within one of the classes mentioned
below is required, as a condition of their employment, to become a
member of one of the state plans. With the exception of certain
contractual conditions, the State System covers the following
classes of employees:
a) any individual employed by the State in a position for
20 hours per week or more,
b) any public school teacher (including administrators
such as a principal) who is regularly employed on at least
a half-time basis,
c) certain Airport Corporation, Economic Development
Corporation and Narragansett Bay Corporation
employees,
d) any correctional officer,
e) anyone employed as a registered nurse by the
Department
of
Behavioral
Healthcare
or
the
Development Disabilities and Hospitals,
f) anyone employed by a participating municipality in a
position for 20 hours a week or more,
g) any police officer or firefighter who are employees of
departments that are participants in MERS,
h) members of the State police hired after July 1, 1987,
and
i) all justices and judges of the Supreme, Superior,
Family, District and Workers’ Compensation Courts, and
Traffic Tribunal engaged after December 31, 1989. 14
12.
13.
14.

See id.
See id.
See EMPS.’

RET.

SYS.

OF

R.I.,

AN

EMPLOYEE’S

GUIDE

TO
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ERSRI was created by the Rhode Island General Assembly in
1936 to benefit state employees, schoolteachers, and participating
municipal employees by providing retirement benefits. 15 The
state is responsible for funding state employees’ benefits and a
portion of the benefits for schoolteachers. As of 2012, ERSRI had
a total of 25,041 state employee participants, comprised of 11,166
active members, 11,200 retirees, and 2,675 inactive members. 16
The ERSRI state employee plan was 56.3% funded. 17 There was a
total of 26,642 teacher participants in ERSRI including 13,212
active members, 10,622 retirees, and 2,808 inactive members. 18
The ERSRI teacher plan was 58.8% funded. 19
In 1951, the General Assembly created MERS, which
empowered municipalities to allow their employees to enroll in a
state-administered plan.20 Pursuant to section 45-21-4 of the
Rhode Island General Laws, each municipality is given the
opportunity to choose whether to participate in MERS. Upon a
municipality so choosing, the eligible employees of the
municipality are required to become MERS participants. The
state is responsible for administering MERS, but municipalities
are obligated to fund MERS participant benefits. As of June 30,
2012, MERS was comprised of 113 units, sixty-eight covering
general municipal employees and forty-five covering police and/or
fire fighters.21 The contribution rate for each unit is statutorily
mandated and augmented by contractual agreements; on average,
UNDERSTANDING THE RHODE ISLAND RETIREMENT SECURITY ACT 4–5 (2012),
https://www.ersri.org/public/documentation/FINAL_RIRSAGuide_January20
12.pdf [hereinafter EMPLOYEE’S GUIDE].
15. An Act to Provide for the Retirement of Employees of the State of
Rhode Island, 1936 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 2334, 868 (codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 36-8-1 to -10-40).
16. See GABRIEL ROEDER SMITH & CO., EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM
OF RHODE ISLAND: ACTUARIAL VALUATION REPORT AS OF JUNE 30, 2012 2 (2012)
[hereinafter EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT].
17. See id.
18. See id. at 3.
19. See id.
20. See An Act to Provide for a Retirement and Benefit System for
Municipal Employees, its Financing and Administration, and its Integration
with the Federal Social Security Act, 1951 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 2784, 374
(codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 45-21-1 to -66).
21. See EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT, supra note 16, at 2. At the time of
writing, the most recent date for which actuarial data was available was
June 30, 2012.
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MERS is funded 82.5% across all units.22
The SPRBT was created in 1987 as a separate plan for the
benefit of state police employees. 23 As of June 30, 2012, the
SPRBT covered 231 active members, ten retirees and four inactive
members, for a total of 245 participants.24 The plan includes two
groups that are funded differently. The state funds participants
hired prior to 1987 on a pay-as-you-go basis from general assets of
the state.25 This amount of funding appears as a line item in the
state’s budget. A second group of participants, however, is funded
by a combination of state and employee contributions that are
statutorily mandated. 26 Specifically, as of June 30, 2012, the
state contributes 17.24% and SPRBT participants contribute
8.75%. 27 The SPRBT was 89.6% funded as of June 30, 2012.28
The General Assembly created the JRBT in 1987 for the
benefit of justices and judges of the Rhode Island court system.29
As of June 30, 2012, the JRBT included fifthy-three active justices
and judges and twelve retirees, for a total of sixty-five
participants.30 Like the SPRBT, the JRBT has two groups that
are funded differently. Justices and Judges hired prior to January
1, 1990 are funded from general state assets on a pay-as-you-go
basis.31 A second group of participants is funded by a combination
of state and JRBT participant contributions.32 For the JRBT, the
state contributes 28.32% and participants contribute 12%. 33 As of

22. See id. at 28; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-21-42 (West 2006 & Supp. 2009).
23. See 1987 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 118, art. 15, § 3, 275
24. See EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT, supra note 16, at 2. At the time of
writing, the most recent date for which actuarial data was available was
June 30, 2012.
25. Id. at 1.
26. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-28-22.1 (West 2006 & Supp. 2007).
27. STATE POLICE RETIREMENT BENEFITS VALUATION REPORT, supra note
24, at 2.
28. Id.
29. See 1987 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 118, art. 15, §1, 274.
30. EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT, supra note 16, at 2. At the time of writing,
the most recent date for which actuarial data was available was June 30,
2012. See id.
31. Id. at 1.
32. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 8-3-16, 36-10-1 (West 2006 & Supp.
2013).
33. JUDICIAL RETIREMENT BENEFITS ACTUARIAL VALUATION, supra note
30, at 2.
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June 30, 2012, the JRBT was 83.4% funded.34
B. Locally Administered Plans
In contrast to the state administered pension plans, there are
thirty-six local pension plans (“LPP” and collectively “Local
System”) administered by municipalities or local employee
unions. 35
For those municipalities with LPPs, each such
municipality or employee union is responsible for administering
and funding LLPs, determining plan provisions, investing plan
assets, and paying retirement benefits. In addition to LPPs,
several municipalities have established other post-employment
benefit plans (“OPEB”) for their employees.
OPEB plans
generally include health-care benefits for retirees, and each
municipality is likewise responsible for administering, funding,
and determining plan provisions, investing plan assets, and
paying benefits. 36
C. Underfunding
1.

State Plans

The widespread media coverage and criticism of Rhode
Island’s underfunded pensions are almost too ubiquitous to
warrant repeating. However, brief mention is necessary to
provide context for the ensuing discussion. Table 1 demonstrates
the unfunded liabilities of state-administered plans as of June 30,
2012.

34. Id.
35. See DENNIS E. HOYLE, AUDITOR GENERAL, STATUS OF PENSION AND
OPEB PLANS ADMINISTERED BY RHODE ISLAND MUNICIPALITIES 1 (Mar. 2010).
36. See id. at 7.
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Table 1

Plan

Funding

Unfunded
Liability

MERS 37

Locally Funded

$262,298,831

ERSRI–State
Employees 38

State Funded

$1,876,069,769

ERSRI–
Teachers 39

40% State Funded,
60% Locally
Funded

$2,626,781,473

SPRBT 40

State Funded

$9,738,000

JRBT 41

State Funded

$8,657,000

Total

$4,783,545,073

2.

Local Plans

The Local System includes twenty-four municipalities that
administer at least one plan for employee participants. 42 Among
the thirty-six total LPPs, the Rhode Island Auditor General
identified twenty-three that were considered at risk and
delineated three categories of risk based on funding levels and the
percentage of annual required contributions made. Category 1
includes seven plans that are funded less than 60% and are
making less than 80% of the annual required contributions.43
Category 2 includes twelve plans that are funded less than 60%
37. MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM ACTUARIAL VALUATION,
supra note 21, at 38.
38. EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM ACTUARIAL VALUATION, supra note
16, at 13.
39. Id.
40. STATE POLICE RETIREMENT BENEFITS ACTUARIAL VALUATION, supra
note 24, at 20.
41. JUDICIAL RETIREMENT BENEFITS ACTUARIAL VALUATION, supra note
30, at 20.
42. See HOYLE, supra note 35, at 7.
43. See id. at 10.
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and are making more than 80% of the annual required
contributions. 44 Category 3 includes four plans that are funded
more than 60% but are either making less than 80% of the annual
required contributions or such annual required contributions are
declining. 45
In total, twenty-three of thirty-six LPPs are considered at
risk.46 Collectively, as of June 30, 2009, the LPPs were 43%
funded and had an unfunded actuarial liability of approximately
$1.9 billion. 47 With respect to the OPEB plans administered by
municipalities, such plans had a collective funding ratio of 1% and
an unfunded actuarial liability of $2.4 billion. 48
II. 2011 PENSION REFORM

In 2011, the Rhode Island General Assembly embarked on a
sweeping reform of the State System and, to some extent, the
Local System. Two acts permanently changed the structure of
pension plans across the state. 49 The Rhode Island Retirement
Security Act (“Retirement Security Act” or “Act”), which made
substantial changes to the State System, has received far greater
criticism and scrutiny than its counterpart, the Retirement
Security Act for Locally Administered Pension Funds (“Local
Act”), which only affects locally administered plans.
A. The Retirement Security Act
The unprecedented Retirement Security Act passed the House
of Representatives (57-15) and Senate (35-2) on November 17,
2011 and was signed into law the following day. 50 Through the
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See HOYLE, supra note 35, at 7. Recently, however, LLPs were
required to submit financial and funding improvement plans to the State
pursuant to section 45-65-4 Rhode Island General Laws on or before April 1,
2012. Presumably, the Treasurer’s Office is undertaking an analysis of the
submitted financials and funding improvement plans with an eye toward
improving the viability of Local Plans.
48. See id.
49. See Rhode Island Retirement Security Act, 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws ch.
408, 1919 [hereinafter Rhode Island Retirement Security Act]; Retirement
Security Act for Locally Administered Pension Funds Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. §§ 45-65-1 to -9 (West 2006 & Supp. 2012).
50. See Rhode Island Retirement Security Act, supra note 49; see also
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Retirement Security Act, the General Assembly intends to “ensure
the sustainability of the state’s public retirement systems.” 51
Section 1 of the Retirement Security Act sets forth sixteen
legislative findings, which explain in detail the reasoning
underlying the reform and conclude with the following four
overarching goals of the Act:
(1) To ensure that cities and towns will be able to provide
retirement benefits that will enable our public employees
to enjoy a dignified retirement.
(2) To ensure a secure and adequate source of retirement
funds for public retiree benefits.
(3) To ensure that the cost of current and future benefits
is not so great and onerous that it jeopardizes the ability
and obligation of the state and its town and cities to fund
the costs of providing our children with an excellent
public education; rebuilding and sustaining our economy;
maintaining roads and bridges; providing assistance,
care, and support of our neediest and most vulnerable
citizens; and addressing other essential public programs
and purposes.
(4) The general assembly expressly finds and declares
that the situation currently confronting the State of
Rhode Island’s publicly financed pension systems has
reached an emergency stage and must be addressed
without delay and the enactment of the Rhode Island
Retirement Security Act of 2011 is reasonable and
necessary to achieve and protect the compelling public
interests listed herein. The general assembly further
finds and declares that the achievement of those
compelling public interests, on balance, far outweigh any
impact that such enactment might have upon the
expectations of active and retired members of the affected
pension systems as to potential future pension benefits. 52
The Rhode Island Retirement Security Act of 2011 (RIRSA), OFFICE
GENERAL TREASURER, available at http://www.treasury.ri.gov/
secure-path-ri/rirsa/legislation.php (last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
51. Rhode Island Retirement Security Act, supra note 49, § 1.
52. Id. § 16(b)(1)-(4).

OF THE
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Prior to enactment, however, the General Treasurer issued a
report in June 2011 that outlined the factors driving the pension
system’s structural deficit. 53 According to the General Treasurer’s
report, the pension crisis is attributable to: (1) the failure to utilize
sound actuarial practices, (2) generous benefit improvements
without corresponding taxpayer or employee contributions, (3)
pension plan design, 54 (4) retirees living longer, and (5) lowerthan-assumed investment returns. 55 With this backdrop, the
following subsections discuss the key provisions of the Retirement
Security Act.
1.

Hybrid Plans

The Retirement Security Act instituted a hybrid plan for
ERSRI state employees, teachers, and MERS and altered the DB
plan for corrections officers, state police, judges, and public safety
employees. 56 Participants retain all benefits accrued as of June
30, 2012, and eligibility for retirement as of June 30, 2013
remains unchanged. 57 The hybrid plan, however, enrolls
participants in both a DB plan and a DC plan. Under the hybrid
plan, each participant contributes 8.75% of their base pay, of
which 3.75% is contributed to the DB plan and 5.0% is contributed
to the DC plan. 58 The state (or municipality responsible) also
contributes 1% to the participant’s DC plan.59
The hybrid plan, however, was not extended to public safety
plans or to the JRBT. The public safety plans and JRBT DB plans
were subject to revisions under the Act. General changes to the
DB plans include limiting service credit multipliers to 1% and
53. See GINA M. RAIMONDO, RHODE ISLAND GENERAL TREASURER, TRUTH
IN NUMBERS: THE SECURITY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF RHODE ISLAND’S
RETIREMENT SYSTEM (June 2011), available at http://www.treasury.

ri.gov/documents/SPRI/TIN-WEB-06-1-11.pdf.
54. Specifically, contributions to certain state pension plans, prior to the
reform, failed to cover the amount of benefits to be paid each year.
55. RAIMONDO, supra note 53, at 3–4.
56. EMPLOYEE’S GUIDE, supra note 14, at 6.
SPRI/FINAL_RIRSAGuide_January2012.pdf.
57. RHODE ISLAND GEN. ASSEMBLY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF RHODE
ISLAND RETIREMENT SECURITY ACT 5 (2011), available at http://www.pension
reformri.com/resources/ReportwithGRSAppendix.pdf.
58. Id. at 5–6.
59. Id. at 6.
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increasing the period used to calculate final average salary from
three to five years.60 Contributions were adjusted down from
8.75% to 3.75% effective on July 1, 2012. 61 Lastly, the vesting
period was reduced from ten to five years. 62 The specific DB plan
modifications are discussed herein.
The MERS plan, which encompasses correctional offices, was
modified to replace declining contributions after thirty years of
service with a 2% continuous accrual. 63
In addition, the
maximum benefit was reduced from 80% to 75%. Correctional
officer participants continue to contribute 8.75% of their base
salary and will not participate in the DC plan. 64
The MERS police and fire plans include both a twenty-fiveyear plan and a twenty-year plan with each municipality or union
electing the plan in which to participate.65 The majority of
participants are in the twenty-year plan. 66 Prior to the Act’s
revisions, under the twenty-five-year plan: (i) a participant could
retire with full benefits after twenty-five years of credited service
or upon reaching age fifty-five with ten years of credited service;
and (ii) the final average salary was based upon the final three
years of service.67 After the Act’s revisions, all MERS police and
fire participants are essentially switched to the twenty-five-year
plan.68 The retirement age requirements are the same, however
“members age 45 with at least 10 years of service currently
eligible to retire before 52 to retire at 52; or retire at current
retirement date but at accrued benefit as of June 30, 2012.” 69 The
final average salary is now based on the last five years of service,
rather than three years, which effectively reduces the benefit at
retirement.70 Like the correctional officers, MERS police and fire

60. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 36-10-9, -10 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).
61. Id. § 36-10-1(a).
62. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF RHODE ISLAND RETIREMENT SECURITY ACT,
supra note 57, at 5.
63. Id. at 6.
64. Id. at 7.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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plans will not participate in the DC plan.71
The SPRBT DB retirement age was modified to allow
participants to retire after a participant’s retirement allowance
reaches 50% and forcing retirement when a participant’s
retirement allowance reaches 65% or when the participant
reaches age sixty-two. 72 In the event a SPRBT participant does
not reach 50% retirement allowance by sixty-two, the Act allows
each such participant to accrue benefits until reaching 50% and
then to retire.73 Overall, the Act allows a SPRBT participant to
work up to thirty-three years, whereas prior to the revisions the
limit was twenty-five years and thirty years depending on hire
date.74 Lastly, final compensation is calculated based on the last
five years of service rather than three years.75
The Act alters the JRBT by creating a 12% contribution rate,
regardless of whether the participant was contributing prior to
July 1, 2012. 76 Prior to the Act, those who were contributing did
so at a rate of 8.75%. 77 Active Supreme Court justices are
excluded from the Act’s provisions altering contribution rates
because of a constitutional provision prohibiting any reduction in
compensation.78 As mentioned above, members of the JRBT will
not participate in the DC plan. 79
2.

COLAs and Re-Amoritzation

The Retirement Security Act does not affect COLAs granted
prior to July 1, 2012 but suspends COLA payments until the
aggregate funding levels of the State System (specifically ERSRI
state employees, JRBT and SPRBT) reach 80%. 80 There are,
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 8.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id.; R.I. CONST. art. X, § 6 (“Judges of supreme court—
Compensation.—The judges of the supreme court shall receive a
compensation for their services, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office.”).
79. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF RHODE ISLAND RETIREMENT SECURITY ACT,
supra note 57, at 8.
80. EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF RHODE ISLAND, RHODE ISLAND
RETIREMENT SECURITY ACT OF 2011 – MUNICIPAL PUBLIC SAFETY 7 (2011),
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however, interim COLA increases calculated at five-year
intervals. 81 Once the State System reaches the aggregate funding
goal, COLAs of 0-4% for the first $25,000 of the participants’
salary will be awarded based on the funds’ average investment
returns.82 The key function of the COLA reform provisions is that
all participants are moved to the same COLA as of July 1, 2012.83
This ensures that COLAs are only granted when the plans are
adequately funded.
The Act’s re-amortization provisions were also a significant
change from the prior scheme. As part of the overall reform,
payment of the existing unfunded liability was extended from the
scheduled nineteen years to twenty-five years. 84 This approach is
intended to reduce volatility and to lessen the burden at the end of
the amortization period.85
B. Pathway to Retirement Security for Locally Administered
Pension Funds Act
The General Assembly enacted the Pathway to Retirement
Security for Locally Administered Pension Funds Act (“Local
Pension Act”) “to provide retirement security to current and
retired municipal employees by codifying standards to promote
the sustainability and longevity of pension plans established and
administered by municipalities.” 86
It is the legislature’s
expressed intent “to begin the process of ensuring the
sustainability of locally administered pension plans and to
advance and maintain the long-term stability of such plans.” 87
The Local Pension Act governs “any defined benefit pension plan
established by a municipality for its employees,” but excludes
plans that: (a) participate in ERSRI or MERS; (b) are established
by a municipality that has filed under Chapter 9 or Chapter 11 of
available at https://www.ersri.org/public/documentation/RI_RetirementSecu
rityActof2011_MERS_%20Pand_F_rev2.pdf; EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF RHODE
ISLAND RETIREMENT SECURITY ACT, supra note 57, at 4.
81. Id. at 7.
82. Id. at 5.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 9.
85. Id.
86. Retirement Security Act for Locally Administered Pension Funds,
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-65-2 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).
87. Id. § 45-65-3.
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the United States Bankruptcy Code; and (c) are established by a
municipality for which a receiver or fiscal overseer has been
appointed pursuant to the Fiscal Stability Act (sections 45-9-1
through 45-9-23 of the Rhode Island General Laws). 88 The
definition of “municipality” in the Local Pension Act embraces
“any town or city in the State of Rhode Island, any city or town
housing authority, fire, water, sewer district, regional school
district or public building authority.” 89
The primary focus of the Local Pension Act is to monitor Local
Plans through reporting requirements and oversight. 90 The Local
Pension Act established a fourteen-member study commission
that is charged with reviewing existing legislation and
recommending changes to improve Local Plan funding levels
(“Study Commission”). 91 Municipalities administering local plans
are required to submit an annual actuarial valuation to the Study
Commission on or before April 1, 2012, with subsequent actuarial
studies to be submitted once every three years.92 Pursuant to the
Act, the state agreed to subsidize 50% of each municipality’s cost

88. Id. § 45-65-4(4).
89. Id. § 45-65-4(5). As mentioned above, the Local Pension Act only
covers DB plans. A plain reading of the Local Pension Act demonstrates that
it does not cover DC plans or hybrid plans. Interestingly, however, the
Auditor General’s Report recommends that local governments consider
alternatives to defined benefit plans such as defined contribution plans or
hybrid plans.89. It seems odd for the Auditor General to recommend an
alternative plan that would allow a municipality to administer a plan outside
the coverage of the Local Pension Act. Perhaps the recommendation was
made with further legislative changes in mind. Furthermore, it is quite
interesting that the statute refers to a Chapter 11 filing by a municipality
under the United States Bankruptcy Code. While it appears evident that
section 45-65-4(b) was included in response to Central Falls’ Chapter 9
petition, the inclusion of a Chapter 11 filing in the Local Pension Act
language begs certain questions. For instance, was Chapter 11 included
because the Rhode Island legislature believes that a municipality would be
eligible for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, or was the reference to Chapter 11
included in response to the court’s decision in In re Northern Mariana Islands
Ret. Fund, No. 12-00003, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131709 (US Dist. Ct.
Northern Mariana Islands, Jun. 13, 2013) (dismissing a Chapter 11 petition
filed by a government employee retirement fund for lack of eligibility under
Chapter 11 and reasoning that the fund was an “instrumentality” of the
government under the Bankruptcy Code).
90. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-65-3.
91. Id. § 45-65-8.
92. Id. § 45-65-6(1).
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of conducting the actuarial study. 93 The actuarial studies must
conform to “accepted actuarial standards and applicable public
pension accounting laws, rules and regulations.” 94 If, as a result
of the required actuarial study, the actuary determines that the
Local Plan is in critical status (that is, less than 60% funded), the
municipality must notify the plan’s participants and beneficiaries,
the General Assembly, the Governor, the General Treasurer, the
Director of Revenue, and the Auditor General within thirty
business days. 95
While largely advisory, the Local Pension Act contains two
enforcement provisions. First, if a Local Plan is determined to be
in critical status, the administrator must submit a “reasonable
alternative funding improvement plan” to the Study Commission
within 180 days of the critical status notice required under section
45-65-6(2) of the Rhode Island General Laws. 96 Second, if a Local
Plan fails to comply with the requirements of the Local Pension
Act, the general treasurer is authorized to withhold state funds
due to the municipality “for any purpose other than education,
including but not limited to, municipal aid provided under §§ 4513-5.1, 45-13-12, 44-34.1-2, 44-13-13, 44-18-18.1, 44-18-36.1(b) and
42-63.1-3.” 97 In February 2013, legislation was introduced which
93. Id. § 45-65-6(3).
94. Id. § 45-65-5.
95. Id. § 45-65-6(2).
96. Id.
97. Id. § 45-65-7. Section 45-13-5.1 of the Rhode Island General Laws
provides for State appropriations in lieu of property taxes for tax-exempt
entities at a rate of 27% of the total tax that would otherwise have been
collected. Section 45-13-12 of the Rhode Island General Laws established a
distressed communities relief fund whereby qualifying communities could
receive State assistance yearly, based on the communities’ tax levy relative to
the total tax levy of all eligible communities. As of June 2013, qualifying
communities are eligible to receive up to $784,458 in State assistance. R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-13-12 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013). Section 44-34.1-2 of
the Rhode Island General Laws provides a reimbursement to municipalities
and fire districts from general State revenues “equal to the amount of lost tax
revenue due to the phase out or reduction of the excise tax.” Under section
44-18-18.1 of the Rhode Island General Laws municipalities are eligible to
receive funds from the State collected a result of taxes, penalties or
forfeitures, interest, costs of suit and fines” for local meals and beverage
taxes. Like local meal and beverage taxes, a municipality is eligible to
receive from the state “the hotel tax, penalties or forfeitures, interest, costs of
suit and fines” under sections 44-18-36.1 and 42-63.1-3 of the Rhode Island
General Laws.
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proposes to have the General Treasurer deposit any funds
withheld from municipalities on account of section 45-65-7 of the
Rhode Island General Laws into an interest bearing escrow
account for a period of one year. 98 At the expiration of the oneyear period, the General Treasurer would deposit the withheld
Under the proposed
funds directly into the Local Plan. 99
legislation, the General Treasurer has the discretion to: (a) release
the withheld funds if the municipality submits an adequate
funding plan; or (b) to seek instructions from the General
Assembly if the Local Plan from which funds are withheld is
insolvent or non-existent. 100
The Local Pension Act, in essence, only creates a structure for
reporting and oversight of Local Plans. The Act does not alter or
modify any of the provisions of the Local Plans or impact
participants’ benefits. It remains to be seen whether the Local
Pension Act is a stepping-stone for more sweeping reform like the
Retirement Security Act enacted for state plans. Certainly, the
Study Commission and legislators will need sufficient time to
scrutinize the actuarial valuations and funding improvement
plans submitted by Local Plans pursuant to section 45-65-6 of the
Rhode Island General Laws.
III. RHODE ISLAND’S APPROACH TO PENSION MODIFICATIONS

Generally, and in Rhode Island, the legal debate surrounding
pension reform focuses on the modification of participants’ pension
benefits. Commonly, there are three legal frameworks under
which modifications to pension benefits are analyzed: (a) the
property approach; (b) the contractual approach; and (c) the
promissory estoppel approach.
Rhode Island courts have
recognized, but have not necessarily applied, all three
approaches. 101 The following discussion outlines the approaches
used by courts applying Rhode Island law to modifications of
98. S. 0522, 2013 Gen. Assemb. Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2013)
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See R.I. Council 94 v. Carcieri, No. PC 10-2859 (R.I. Super. Ct. filed
Sept. 13, 2011) (Carcieri II) (discussing changes to the Retirement Security
Act under the Contracts Clause, Takings Clause, and Promissory Estoppel);
see also Nonnemacher v. City of Warwick, 722 A.2d 1199 (R.I. 1999)
(discussing municipal ordinance changing pension benefits under the
Contracts Clause).
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pension and/or retiree benefits.
A.

Property Approach

The Takings Clause provides that “[p]rivate property shall not
be taken for public uses, without just compensation.” 102 Several
cases, applying Rhode Island law, recognize the property approach
to pension modifications under the takings clause. 103 The key
inquiry in a Takings Clause analysis is whether the plaintiff has a
constitutionally protected contract right to the pension benefits
being altered. 104 Under the property theory, plaintiffs argue that
a constitutionally protected property right exists in vested pension
benefits such that modification of benefits by legislative act is a
taking without just compensation. 105
In R.I. Council 94 v. Carcieri, 106 Judge William Smith of the
United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island
briefly discussed the Takings Clause approach to legislative
pension modifications.107 The case addressed the State’s
enactment of section 36-12-4 of the Rhode Island General Laws,
which reduced the amount the state would contribute to state
retiree health benefits for employees not yet retired. 108 Council
102. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 16.
103. See, e.g., Parella v. Ret. Bd. of the R.I. Emps. Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46,
57–59, 62 (1st Cir. 1999); Nat’l Educ. Ass’n - R.I. v. Ret. Bd. of the R.I. Emps.’
Ret. Sys., 172 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 1999); Carcieri II, No. PC 10-2859 at 12,
17, 22, 26.
104. See, e.g., Parella, 173 F.3d at 59. Judge Taft-Carter recognized the
takings clause approach in Carcieri but limited her analysis to “whether the
statutorily-created ERSRI pension plan establishe[d] a contractual
relationship between the State of Rhode Island and ERSRI participants for
purposes of the Contract and Takings Clauses of the Rhode Island
Constitution.” Carcieri II, No. PC 10-2859, at 1–2, 7–9, 12, 39. Because of
the procedural posture of the case, Judge Taft-Carter did not actually apply
the takings clause analysis, but nonetheless held that retirees possessed
implied unilateral contract rights arising from ERSRI. Id. at 38-39.
Presumably, at some point in the continued litigation, Judge Taft-Carter will
be presented with the opportunity to actually apply a takings clause analysis
to the 2009 and 2010 ERSRI amendments.
105. See e.g., Carcieri II, No. PC 10-2859, at 12, 17, 22, 26.
106. There are multiple iterations of the case captioned R.I. Council 94 v.
Carcieri at the state and federal level. See, e.g., R.I. Council 94 v. Carcieri,
705 F. Supp. 2d 165, 165 (D.R.I. 2010) (Carcieri I); Carcieri II, No. PC 102859, at 1.
107. Carcieri I, 705 F. Supp. 2d at 165, 182.
108. Id. at 167 (citation omitted).
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94, a labor union, represented approximately 4,000 employees who
contracted with the state through collective bargaining
agreements.109 Council 94 claimed that the state violated the
Contracts Clause and Takings Clause by enacting legislation that
reduced the amount of state contributions to retiree health
benefits.110 Judge Smith began with a Contracts Clause analysis
(discussed in more detail herein) and ultimately concluded that
Council 94’s claim failed because the collective bargaining
agreement (“CBA”) had properly terminated prior to the state
enacting the legislation that altered benefits and because there
was no language in the CBA that extended the expected benefits
beyond the termination of the CBA. 111 Therefore, the retirees had
no contractual relationship upon which to base their claim.112
Judge Smith next, when addressing the legislative change to
retiree benefits, recognized that the “Takings Clause forbids the
taking of private property for public use without just
compensation.” 113 However, because Council 94 failed to
demonstrate that a valid contractual right to future retiree health
benefits existed, Judge Smith determined that Council 94 “failed
to allege sufficient facts that would support a Takings Clause
claim.” 114 Judge Smith’s treatment of the issue in Council 94 v.
Carcieri suggests that, with the appropriate facts, a plaintiff could
be successful under the Takings Clause against legislative
modification of post-employment benefits. 115
Similarly, in a later Rhode Island Superior Court iteration of
Council 94 v. Carcieri, Judge Taft-Carter addressed legislative
changes to the ERSRI statutory scheme that increased the
retirement age, decreased the amount of service allowances, and
reduced COLAs. 116 Judge Taft-Carter undertook an extensive
discussion of pension cases in Rhode Island, but her analysis
focused on the Contract Clause without reaching the Takings

109. Id. at 168.
110. Id. at 173.
111. Id. at 174–77.
112. Id. at 177.
113. Id. at 182 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 16).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. R.I. Council 94 v. Carcieri, No. PC 10-2859 (R.I. Super. Ct. filed Sept.
13, 2011) (Carcieri II) 1, 4, 6–7.
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Clause. 117 Nonetheless, Judge Taft-Carter’s holding in Council 94
v. Carcieri is instructive on pension modification claims advanced
under the Takings Clause because she determined that long-term
state employees “possess implied unilateral contract rights arising
from the ERSRI” statutory scheme. 118 As a practical matter,
Judge Taft-Carter essentially established the property right upon
which the long-term state employee ERSRI participants could
maintain a Takings Clause claim.
B.

Contractual Approach

Unlike other states, Rhode Island has no constitutional
provision explicitly protecting pension benefits. 119 As a result,
challenges to pension modifications are commonly brought under
the Contracts Clause of the Rhode Island and/or the United States
Constitutions. 120 The Contracts Clauses of both constitutions
prohibit states from enacting any law impairing the obligations of
contracts. 121 The Rhode Island constitution provides that “[n]o ex
post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall
be passed.” 122 Several Rhode Island cases present a similar fact
pattern: a plaintiff seeks to invalidate a state or local law that
impacts their pension or retirement benefits on the basis that a
contract existed between the plaintiff and the state or local
entity.123
For example, in Nonnemacher v. City of Warwick, two retiree
117. Id. at 9–39.
118. Id. at 39.
119. Id. at 13–14. “Over the past century, a number of states have passed
constitutional amendments protecting the contractual right of public
employees to their pensions in varying degrees . . . Rhode Island, however,
has no such provision.” Id. at 14 (citation omitted).
120. See, e.g., Nonnemacher v. City of Warwick, 722 A.2d 1199, 1200 (R.I.
1999); see also Carcieri II, No. PC 10-2859, at 13–14 (explaining that in
“states without clear constitutional or statutory provisions” protecting
contractual rights in employee pensions, “a growing number have adopted
the view that public employees possess implied-in-fact contractual rights to
their statutorily-created pensions.”).
121. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; R.I. CONST. art. I, §12.
122. R.I. CONST. art. I, §12.
123. See, e.g., City of Newport v. Local 1080, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters 54
A.3d 976, 978 (R.I. 2012); Arena v. City of Providence, 919 A.2d 379, 381-86
(R.I. 2007); Nonnenmacher, 722 A.2d at 1200; Carcieri II, No. PC 10-2859, at
2.
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firefighters challenged a 1980 Warwick ordinance that reduced
disability retirement payments by income earned from other
employment. 124 Prior to the 1980 amendment, firefighters were
entitled to 66.66% of their then-current salary upon disability
retirement without the income setoff. 125 The plaintiffs argued
that, by enacting the offset provision, the ordinance violated the
Contracts Clause.126
In evaluating the ordinance, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
set forth a three-pronged analysis for determining whether a state
or municipal law impermissibly impairs the obligation of
contracts. 127 First, the court must determine if a contract
exists. 128 Second, the court must determine if the contract was
impaired and whether such impairment is substantial. 129 If the
impairment is substantial, the court must then determine
whether the impairment is reasonable and necessary to serve a
legitimate public purpose. 130 As mentioned previously, Judge
Taft-Carter recently followed this three-pronged approach in
Council 94 v. Carcieri where two labor unions’ challenged 2009
and 2010 amendments to ERSRI that impacted retiree benefits. 131
Judge Taft-Carter’s holding, that retired pension participants
“possess implied unilateral contract rights arising from the
ERSRI” statutory scheme, has the practical effect of satisfying the
first element of the Contracts Clause analysis.132
124. Nonnemacher, 722 A.2d at 1201.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1200.
127. Id. The Supreme Court of the United States developed this threepart test in General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186–87 (1992) and
Energy Reserves Group Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co., 459 U.S. 400,
411-12 (1983). Rhode Island Courts have applied this test in other contracts
clause cases. See e.g., R.I. Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp. v. Brown, 659 A.2d
95, 106 (R.I. 1995); Carcieri II No. PC 10-2859, at 2.
128. Nonnenmacher, 722 A.2d at 1202 (citing McGrath v. R.I. Ret. Bd., 88
F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1996)).
129. Id. (citing Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411–12).
130. Id.
131. Carcieri II, at 4, 7, 10.
132. Id. at 39. Judge Taft-Carter is currently presiding over five pension
challenge cases including Rhode Island Superior Court Case Nos. 12-3166,
12-3167, 12-3168, 12-3169 and 12-3579; the parties in these consolidated
cases have been in settlement discussions for over a year. Ted Nesi, RI
Pension Settlement Talks Continue Into February, WPRI (Feb. 3, 2014),
http://wpri.com/2014/02/03/ri-pension-settlement-talks-continue-intofebruary/. On February 14, 2014, the parties reached a proposed settlement
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Because Rhode Island courts were faced with attempts to
modify existing pension benefits, the legal analysis and discussion
did not focus on the potential for improving the long-term viability
of pension plans without modification. This is no fault of the
courts; rather it was a response to the factual scenario presented.
There exists a legal framework, in the context of pension plan
improvement, which has not been explored and may present a
viable alternative to modification as the primary means for
pension plan improvement.
IV. IMPROVEMENT OF THE LOCAL PENSION SYSTEM USING A UNIFIED
APPROACH AND THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE

While the discussion above includes cases where existing
benefits were altered by state legislation or local law in an
attempt to approve the long-term viability of pension plans, the
following discussion shifts the focus from modification towards an
alternative approach—unifying the Local System using the
preemption doctrine.
Rhode Island has thirty-six local pension plans administered
by municipalities or local employee unions.133 In 2011, the state
began monitoring Local Plans through the Local Pension Act,
which contains certain reporting requirements. 134 Even though
the Local Pension Act was an important step in developing a plan
to move Local Pensions towards fiscal strength, the General
Treasurer recognized that the state must consider whether state
agreement that has been presented to interested parties for ratification. For
a copy of the settlement proposal, see SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (2014),
available at http://ripensioninfo.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/
Settlement-Agreement.pdf. In general, the proposed settlement agreement
sought to amend the Retirement Security Act by (1) reinstating certain COLA
payments, (2) adjusting contribution rates, and (3) creating a retirement age
transition period. See Exhibit B to Settlement Agreement. While the
proposed settlement retracted some of the modifications brought by the 2011
legislation, many of the provisions aimed at correcting the structural deficit
remain intact. It now seems that the proposal has been rejected and litigation
will commence. Kaylen Auer, Judge Rules State Worker Union Pension
Lawsuit Can go to Trial, PROVIDENCE BUS. NEWS (Apr. 16, 2014, 8:58 AM),
http://pbn.com/Judge-rules-state-worker-union-pension-lawsuit-can-go-totrial,96497.
133. Retirement Security Act for Locally Administered Pension Funds,
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-64-3 (West 2006 & Supp. 2012).
134. Id.
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legislation is necessary to enable reform of the Local Pensions. 135
Presumably, the legislation contemplated would include merging
the Local Plans with one of the state-administered plans or
bringing the Local Plans under the administrative umbrella of the
state.
The idea of merging Local Plans into one of the stateadministered plans is not a novel one. In 2011, the Auditor
General recommended that Local Plans be merged into MERS and
that the state consider legislative changes to eliminate the
obstacles to merging Local Plans into MERS. 136 One of the
primary obstacles cited by the Auditor General is the
nonconforming benefit structure of Local Plans.137 In addition,
the Auditor General recommended that the state consider
legislation that would remove pension benefits from municipal
collective bargaining agreements and/or revise the MERS benefit
structure.138 The advantages to unifying the Local Plans with a
State Plan include reduced administrative costs, increased
investment performance, increased transparency, and reduction of
investment risk. Similar benefits could be obtained by the State’s
assumption of the administration of Local Plans.
The most apparent benefit of such an arrangement would be
the immediate reduction of administrative costs by eliminating
the several municipalities’, unions’, or local pension boards’
obligations to administer the thirty-six Local Plans. The Auditor
General also recommended pooled investments for Local Plans to
accomplish similar goals. 139 Similarly, the Director of Revenue
suggested that the Study Commission recommend legislation to
correct challenges facing the Local Systems if necessary. 140 The
General Treasurer has also suggested that state legislation may
be necessary to improve Local Plans. 141
135. See Gina M. Raimondo, Next Up: Reforming Local Pension Plans,
PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 21, 2011, at B6.
136. HOYLE, supra note 35, at 33–39.
137. Id. at 32.
138. Id. at 34, 37.
139. Id.
140. See ROSEMARY BOOTH GALLOGLY, DEP’T OF REVENUE, OVERSIGHT OF
MUNICIPAL FINANCES AND LOCALLY-ADMINISTERED PENSION PLANS IN RHODE
ISLAND, 50 (Dec. 6, 2012).
141. Ted Nesi, Raimondo: Move 36 Local Pension Plans into State-Run
System, WPRI (Jan. 30, 2012), http://blogs.wpri.com/2012/01/30/raimondo-
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Foreshadowed by the suggestions of the Auditor General,
Director of Revenue, and the General Treasurer, the state is
presumably considering legislation that would: (a) merge local
plans with one of the state-administered plans (i.e. MERS); (b)
bring Local Plans under state administration, even if not joined
with one of the state-administered plans; and (c) enable Local
Plans to pool investments. While the Auditor General, Director of
Revenue, and General Treasurer have suggested that state
legislation may be necessary to improve the Local System; there
has been little public discussion, if any, on how the State might
accomplish its goal. Assuming the State determines it is prudent
to enact legislation to accomplish any of the above-mentioned
methods to improve the Local System, the State will find a legal
framework for its local pension reform in the preemption doctrine.
A. Preemption of Municipal Laws
As mentioned above, a local authority or employee union
administers the thirty-six Local Plans in Rhode Island. 142 These
Local Plans exist pursuant to the cities’ or towns’ constitutional
right to govern local matters. Specifically, the Rhode Island
Constitution affords cities and towns the “right to self government
in all local matters” but reserves to the state the “power to act in
relation to the property, affairs and government of any city or
town by general laws which shall apply alike to all cities and
towns.” 143 Currently, municipal ordinances and local laws (and,
to a certain extent, collective bargaining agreements) govern the
administration, funding, provisions, investments, and payment of
pension benefits for Local Plans. 144 In order for the State to bring
Local Plans under the auspices of state administration, the state
could preempt the entire field of local pension governance by
enacting a statewide legislative scheme for local plans.
To determine whether statewide legislation overruling the
local pension ordinances is permissible, Rhode Island courts would
apply well-established principles of the preemption doctrine to the
move-36-local-pension-plans-into-state-run-system/.
142. Retirement Security Act for Locally Administered Pension Funds,
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-64-3 (West 2006 & Supp. 2012).
143. See R.I. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 1, 4.
144. See, e.g., BRISTOL TOWN CODE art. IV, § 21-101 (1998); CRANSTON, R.I.
CODE OF ORDINANCES §2-20-010 (2012).
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state’s legislative action.145 The Rhode Island Supreme Court has
pronounced the preemption doctrine as follows: “[a] state statute
preempts municipal ordinances when either the language in the
ordinance contradicts the language in the statute or when the
Legislature has intended to ‘thoroughly occupy the field.’” 146 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court’s (“Court”) analysis of the
relationship between a state statute and a municipal law or
ordinance is guided by two central inquiries. 147 First, the Court
must determine whether there is a direct and material conflict
between the two laws.148 To resolve whether a conflict exists, the
court must examine the intent of the “legislature when it enacted
the statute.” 149
Second, the Court must decide “whether the General
Assembly intended that its statutory scheme completely occupy
the field of regulation on a particular subject.” 150 To answer the
second inquiry, the Court must ask whether “state control is to be
exclusive or whether the control is to be exercised concurrently by
the state and by the municipality.” 151 The Court has said that
where the General Assembly has enacted a complex statutory
scheme, it is evidence that the state intended to occupy the
field. 152 Therefore, in order for the state to improve Local Plans
by merging them into one of the state-administered plans or
taking over Local Plans administration, the state should include
its legislative intent in the statute and enact a complex statutory
scheme that is broad in scope and applies evenly to all cities,
towns and local entities.
To satisfy preemption principles any proposed state
legislation should definitively express the state’s intent. For
example, the state expressed its intent to reform the State System
in the Retirement Security Act. Specifically, the state pronounced
145. See Coastal Recycling, Inc. v. Connors, 854 A.2d 711, 715 (R.I. 2004);
Town of E. Greenwich v. O’Neil, 617 A.2d 104, 109 (R.I. 1992).
146. Connors, 854 A.2d at 715 (quoting O’Neil, 617 A.2d at 109).
147. See State ex rel. City of Providence v. Auger, 44 A.3d 1218, 1229–30
(R.I. 2012).
148. Id. at 1229 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1230 (quoting Grasso Serv. Ctr., Inc. v. Sepe, 962 A.2d 1283,
1289 (R.I. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
151. Wood v. Peckham, 98 A.2d 669, 671 (R.I. 1953).
152. See Town of East Greenwich v. O’Neil, 617 A.2d 104, 110 (R.I. 1992).
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that the legislation was intended to “ensure the sustainability of
the state’s public retirement systems.” 153 A similar
pronouncement for local plans should satisfy a court’s inquiry into
the state’s intent to occupy the field. 154 Second, any proposed
legislation reform should apply evenly to all local plans within the
state, to ensure that the legislation complies with the home rule
provisions of the Rhode Island Constitution.155 Such a broad
state statutory scheme should satisfy a court’s inquiry into
whether the state intended to occupy the entire field of regulation.
Lastly, the state should include in any proposed legislation the
determination that the state intends to thoroughly, completely
and exclusively occupy the field of local pension governance. This
will ensure that any municipal laws or local ordinances that
attempt to govern local pensions will be in direct conflict with the
state scheme, and therefore invalid.
Perhaps most importantly, the state could reform the Local
System without modifying existing pension or retiree benefits,
thereby avoiding the constitutional challenges discussed in
Section III supra. With carefully crafted legislation, the state
could take over administration of the Local Plans but would not
assume the obligation to fund such plans or modify benefit
provisions.
Admittedly, a state scheme that only assumed
responsibility for administering the Local Plans would not rectify
the structural problems facing Local Plans. But, state assumption
of Local Plans administration would obtain the costs savings
recognized by the General Treasurer, including reduced
administrative costs, increased investment performance,
increased transparency, and reduction of investment risk.
V.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing provides an analysis of the preemption
framework under which legislation could be enacted to improve
the viability of Local Plans and meet the goals identified by the
General Treasurer, Director of Revenue, and Auditor General.
While the legislature took the important first step of monitoring
153. Rhode Island Retirement Security Act, supra note 49, at ch. 408, § 1.
154. See State ex rel. City of Providence v. Auger, 44 A.3d 1218, 1230-31
(R.I. 2012).
155. See R.I. CONST. art. XIII, § 4.
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Local Plans, the fractionalized local system presents an
opportunity to address a problem of statewide concern with
serious implications on the State’s economic future and the
financial well being of its employees and residents.
Given the pervasive and growing nature of unfunded pension
liabilities in Rhode Island, using the preemption doctrine as their
tool, the State’s fiscal leaders and lawmakers should carefully
assess the potential for implementing a statewide legislative
scheme that would preempt municipal and local laws governing
Local Plans in an effort to improve the local pension system.

